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With the federal court caseload continuing to grow at a rapid rate
and appellate dockets lengthening even more rapidly than trial
dockets,1 the resulting pressure on the federal courts of appeals must
inevitably result in an occasional lapse from the high standard of
judicial craftsmanship which those courts are expected to maintain.
Whether for that reason or some other, the Tenth Circuit appears
to have been guilty of such a lapse in Love v. Pullman Co.,2 a case
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The effect
of the court's holding is to invalidate a procedure which the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has utilized since its
inception, thereby threatening to deprive thousands of potential plain-
tiffs of their federal remedy.4 That result is not dictated by the statute;
nor is it supported either by prior case law or by the court's reason-
ing, as the following analysis will reveal. An understanding of the
case must begin with an examination of the basic structure of Title
VII and of the EEOC procedure at issue.
I. THE PROCEDURE
Title VII provides a federal source of administrative and judicial
relief for persons subject to discriminatory employment practices
occurring after July 2, 1965.5 While the Act does not reach discrim-
inatory practices occurring before that date, it does forbid subsequent
facially nondiscriminatory practices which perpetuate the effects of
discriminatory practices abandoned prior to the effective date of
Title VII.6 However, any complaint filed under the provisions of
1 Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit estimates that the volume of federal appeals
has increased more than 100% in the last six years while the backlog in the courts of
appeals has increased 300%. Brown, The Rat Race, the Human Race, and the Court-
house Race, REPORT OF THE ABA SE-rION OF LABOR REATIONS LAw 170, 183 (1968).
2 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324 (10th Cir. 1969).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
4 See text at note 16 infra.
5 The effective date of Title VII was contained in § 716 of the Act and appears as a
note following 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
6 See, e.g., Papermakers & Paperworkers, Local 189 v. United States, 60 CCH Lab. Cas.
9289 (5th Cir. 1969). Judge Wisdom's opinion includes a careful examination of the
prior cases considering this issue at 6694-6700.
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Title VII must allege that a practice prohibited by the statute has
occurred since that date.
The House version of H.R. 7152, the bill which became the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, was subjected to major amendments in the Sen-
ate. One of the amendments to Title VII requires that individuals
alleging discrimination in employment attempt to utilize the services
of the state fair employment practice commissions before seeking re-
lief under federal law.7 Thus, if the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred in a state which has a state agency properly em-
powered to grant or seek relief from the practice, the aggrieved party
must first initiate proceedings with the state agency.8 He may not
file a charge with the EEOC until sixty days after his filing with the
state agency or until the state agency has terminated its proceedings.9
Congress was also concerned that charges not be allowed to grow
stale, either because of complainant or state agency inertia, before
being brought to the EEOC. Therefore, any charge filed with the
EEOC is invalid unless filed within thirty days of termination of
the state proceedings or within 210 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice, whichever is earlier.10 If the EEOC is unable
to obtain voluntary compliance, it will so notify the aggrieved party
who then may file an action in the federal district court within thirty
days. 1  I
This brief summary does not set forth all the details of the admin-
istrative procedure, nor does the statute. One question which the
statute leaves unanswered is what action the EEOC should take when
it receives a complaint which must be considered by a state agency
before it can be properly filed with the EEOC. In requiring that all
employers subject to the Act post informational posters approved by
7 See Senator Humphrey's discussion of the amendment at 110 CONG. REc. 12724-5
(1964).
8 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(b) (1964).
9 Id.
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964), In a state whose fair employment practice act in-
cludes a relatively long initial filing period, a conflict may arise between this provision
and the requirement that the state agency be given sixty days to attempt to settle the
case. For example, if a complainant files a charge with a state agency more than 150 days
after an alleged discriminatory act in a state with a 180-day filing period, he cannot
allow the state proceedings to continue for sixty days and also meet the requirement of
filing with the EEOC within 210 days. The EEOC regulations construe the 210-day
requirement as controlling in such cases. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(v) (1969). A Colorado
district court has taken the opposite view, holding that the premature filing of a
charge with the EEOC will toll the running of the 210-day period until the sixty-day
state deferral period has lapsed. Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 61 CCH Lab. Cas.
9350 (D. Colo. 1969).
11 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(e) (1964).
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the Commission,12 Title VII assumed that many complaints falling
within a state agency's jurisdiction would be filed initially with the
EEOC. One alternative for handling premature complaints would
be for the Commission to reject them outright. The complainant
would then be left to find his own way to the state agency and back
to the EEOC-thus bearing the risk of failing to comply with one
of the time limitation periods. The Commission rejected that alter-
native from the beginning and adopted the policy of referring the
charges to the state agencies on behalf of the individuals who filed
them with the EEOC. Two deferral procedures were developed; one
is described as follows:
Where a charge is filed with the Commission alleging the
commission of an unlawful employment practice in a state or
locality to whose FEP agency the Commission is required to
defer, the Commission will refer that charge to the appropriate
state or local agency. Sixty days after the commencement of
such state or local proceedings .... the Commission will no-
tify the charging party that the 60-day ... period has expired
and inquire whether or not he wishes the Commission to
assert jurisdiction. If the charging party responds affirmatively,
the Commission will proceed with its investigation. 13
In practice the Commission would send a copy of the charge to the
state agency, retaining the original. After the lapse of sixty days or
termination of the state proceedings, the EEOC would send a letter
to the charging party informing him that he was now entitled to seek
relief from the federal agency. The letter would include a statement,
which the charging party was instructed to sign and return if he still
desired federal assistance, requesting the Commission to assume juris-
diction. If the form was returned, the Commission then regarded the
date of receipt of the form as the official date of filing of the charge.
The second procedure, followed by the Commission in processing
Love's complaint, provides for automatic assumption of jurisdiction
by the EEOC after the state agency terminates its proceedings. As
this procedure is now detailed in the Commission's regulations,14 the
EEOC notifies the complainant that the case is being deferred to a
local agency and informs him that the Commission will automatically
assume jurisdiction after the lapse of sixty days or termination of
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1O (1964).
13 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTrcEs GumE 1254.15 (citing EEOC General Counsel opinion
letters of November 18, 1965, and December 2, 1965, and an EEOC decision of December
8, 1965).
14 29 CY.R. § 1601.12 (1969).
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state proceedings unless requested not to do so.' 5 During the first three
years of the Commission's operation, 4,271 complaints were deferred
to state agencies under the Commission's state deferral procedures.' 6
If these procedures are invalid, all of those cases are improperly filed
and none of those parties are entitled to seek relief either from the
EEOC or in the federal courts.
II. THE FACTS
Earl Love worked as a porter for the Pullman Company for more
than forty years, achieving the position of "porter in charge" in 1951.
In 1963 Love filed a written complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission alleging that porters in charge and conductors have essen-
tially identical duties and responsibilities, but that conductors receive
substantially higher wages. He further alleged that Negroes are re-
stricted to the classification of porter while the classification of con-
ductor is virtually all-white.'7 Apparently Love was unable to obtain
satisfactory relief from the state agency.'8 Sometime in the summer
of 1965 he returned to the Colorado agency and orally restated his
complaint without filing a new written complaint. Both federal courts
regarded the 1965 complaint as a request, in substantial compliance
with Colorado law, to reopen the 1963 matter.19 The state commission
again terminated its proceedings on July 30, 1965, and notified Love
of that fact.20
On May 23, 1966, Love sent a letter to the EEOC containing
essentially the same allegations as his complaints to the Colorado
commission. Following its standard procedure, the EEOC deferred
the case to the Colorado commission in order that it could consider
the charges before the EEOC assumed jurisdiction. Because the Col-
orado agency had already considered the issues involved in the charge,
it sent a letter back to the EEOC declining to accept the sixty-day
deferment period, waiving it, and requesting the Commission to pro-
ceed with its investigation. On May 3, 1968, the EEOC notified Love
15 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(iii), (iv), and (v) (1969).
16 1 EEOC ANN. REP. 61 (1966); 2 EEOC ANN. REP. 52 (1967); 3 EEOC ANN. REP. 33
(1968). Figures are not yet available for fiscal 1969.
17 Love v. Pullman, 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324, at 6845 (10th Cir. 1969). Similar alle-
gations have been extensively litigated in the Eighth Circuit involving the classifications
of porter and brakeman. See, e.g., Norman v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th
Cir. 1969) and cases cited therein at 76.
18 Love v. Pullman, 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9240, at 6518 (D. Colo. 1969).
'9 Id.; 61 CCH Lab. Gas. 9324, at 6846.
20 61 CCH Lab. Gas. T 9324, at 6846.
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of its inability to achieve voluntary compliance and informed him
of his right to bring suit in federal court within thirty days.21
Suit was filed by Love within thirty days and Pullman promptly
moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction and because the
action was moot.22 The district court treated the motion as one for
summary judgment and granted it on the grounds that the case was
moot and that Love's charge with the EEOC was not timely filed.
The substance of the latter holding is contained in these two para-
graphs:
The Civil Rights Commission of the State of Colorado ter-
minated its proceeding on July 30, 1965, and so notified Mr.
Love. No further contact was had by Mr. Love with the State
Commission. He filed his complaint with the EEOC on May
23, 1966.
It is the court's opinion that the state proceedings were
effectively terminated on July 30, 1965, and that the plain-
tiff's period within which to file a complaint with the EEOC
commenced on July 31, 1965. As Mr. Love did not file with
the EEOC until May 23, 1966, it is the court's conclusion that
the charge and complaint before the EEOC was not filed
within the time required by 42 USCA, § 20O0e-5(d), and that
the EEOC did not have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Love's
charge. As Mr. Love's charge was not timely filed with that
body, this court is also without jurisdiction to hear the com-
plaint herein.2 3
The court made no mention anywhere in its opinion of the EEOC
deferral to the Colorado commission. Love appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.
III. THE CASE ON APPEAL
The Tenth Circuit did not find it necessary to discuss the mootness
issue: "We must affirm the trial court on the timeliness of filing issue,
and to thereby give effect to the time limits expressed in the statute. '24
The reasoning of the court to support this conclusion reflects a mis-
understanding both of the Title VII case law and the statute itself.
Although the heart of the court's opinion is its conclusion that the
21 Id.
22 Love had resigned from his position in November 1968. 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324,
at 6845.
23 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9240, at 6518.
24 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324, at 6846.
1969]
The University of Chicago Law Review
EEOC deferral to the Colorado commission was ineffective, its dis-
cussion of the earlier Colorado proceedings also reflects this misunder-
standing.
A. The Relevance of the 1965 Colorado Proceedings
The trial court found, and the record shows, that the Col-
orado commission terminated its proceedings on July 30, 1965,
and so notified him. We also agree that this second period of
consideration was an effective reopening of prior proceedings
on the same complaint. Thus if appellant had filed his com-
plaint with the EEOC within thirty days thereafter there
would be no question as to its authority to act on such a
complaint.2 5
The last sentence quoted ignores several questions about the Com-
mission's authority-arising from the effective date of the Act, the
continuing nature of the alleged unlawful practice, the nature of the
Colorado proceedings, and the content of Love's 1965 oral complaint.
First, the EEOC can only process charges alleging discriminatory acts
occurring subsequent to July 2, 1965.26 If the practices considered by
the Colorado commission were not alleged to have occurred after that
date, the state agency would technically not have had an opportunity
to consider the exact charges which would have to be made to the
EEOC. Yet neither court's opinion Teveals the content of Love's 1965
complaint-or even the date when it was made. Moreover, if the 1965
Colorado proceeding was a "reopening" of the 1963 case, as both courts
interpreted it,27 presumably the alleged discriminatory practices in the
case actually occurred in 1963 or earlier-long before the effective date
of Title VII.
Second, if the Colorado proceedings were based on practices alleged
to have occurred in 1963 or earlier, a charge filed with the EEOC by
Love in 1965 would be barred by the requirement that the charge be
filed within 210 days of the alleged unlawful practice.28 On the other
hand, it could be argued that since the alleged practice is continuing
in nature, the charge was filed within 210 days of the unlawful practice
even though not filed within 210 days of the most recent date of oc-
currence alleged in the state complaint. If the intent of Congress were
interpreted to require early filing with the EEOC to insure that the
Commission could begin its investigation while evidence was still fresh
25 Id. at 6846-7.
26 See note 5 supra.
27 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9342, at 6846; 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9240, at 6518.
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964).
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and readily available, that rationale would not apply to continuing
violation cases and would support a loose construction of the 210-day
filing requirement in such cases. Although this question of interpreta-
tion is open at the moment and the problem was pointed out by the
dissent in the case,29 the majority did not even consider it.
The best argument in favor of the court's statement is that a charge
need not be deferred to a state agency when the agency has already con-
sidered and rejected substantially the same charge. However, that argu-
ment would apply with equal force to Love's charge filed with the
EEOC on May 23, 1966.30 Since the court rejects the validity of that
charge, this cannot be the argument the court relies on in stating that
a charge could have been filed within thirty days of the Colorado
termination.
The criticism above may seem only academic since Love did not file
a charge with the EEOC within thirty days of the Colorado commis-
sion's decision. Unfortunately, however, the court's failure even to
recognize the preliminary issues in the case reveals the misunderstand-
ing of Title VII which the court brings to its discussion of the state
deferral issue.
B. The Validity of the EEOC State Deferral Procedure
The court discusses extensively the proposition that state fair em-
ployment practice commissions cannot be bypassed by an individual
seeking to have his case placed before the EEOC or a federal district
court.31 Yet that issue is not in question, and a simple cite to, the
statute would have seemed sufficient to make the point:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice oc-
curring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has
a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to insti-
tute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving
notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) of
this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the
State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated .... 32
29 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9342, at 6848.
30 The EEOC has now taken the position that a charge filed with the EEOC need not
be deferred under these circumstances. See EEOC Decision 68-2-765E, April 16, 1969,
CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 8022.
3' 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324, at 6847-8.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
1969]
The University of Chicago Law Review
The real issue is whether the individual must physically place the
complaint in the hands of the state agency or whether the EEOC can
convey the charge to the agency on his behalf. The Commission's
answer, that it may act on behalf of the complainant, seems to be the
correct one for two reasons. First, complainants proceeding through
the maze of state and federal procedural prerequisites without the help
of legal counsel would be subject to high risk of running afoul of one
of the legal technicalities. As the courts have recognized, however, in
refusing to apply technical common law pleading rules to charges
filed with the Commission,33 EEOC proceedings are intended to be
lay-initiated. That this was a major consideration to the Commission
in determining what policy to adopt is evidenced by the current EEOC
regulations governing deferral to state agencies:
It is the experience of the Commission that because of the
complexities of the present procedures, persons who seek the
aid of the Commission are often confused and even risk loss
of the protection of the Act. Accordingly it is the intent of
the Commission to simplify filing procedures for parties in
deferral States and localities, and thereby avoid the accidental
forfeiture of important Federal rights.3 4
Second, too often the procedural hurdles standing between an ag-
grieved individual and his potential remedy have the appearance of
being designed to prevent the individual from ever receiving any re-
lief. Turned away from the EEOC with instructions to see the state
agency and then come back, many complainants might well conclude
that they were once more "being given the run-around." Each addi-
tional procedural rule requiring further individual initiative acts as a
screen to filter out the doubtful and the discouraged. The state deferral
procedure adopted by the EEOC is an effort to insure that both the
timid and the belligerent will have access to the Commission.
1. Initiation of state proceedings. The only discussion by the court
of who may file the complaint with the state agency is the following
paragraph:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is precise in its requirement
that the States with adequate statutes and machinery have the
33 See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel, & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968);
Marquez v. Ford Motor Co., 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9332 (D. Neb. 1969); Logan v. General
Fireproofing Co., 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9317 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Cal. 1968); Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum &
Brass Co., 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 9137 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
34 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (1969).
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first opportunity to consider complaints. This first opportunity
is a clear requirement in the sequences set out in the Act.
This opportunity cannot come by an advice from the EEOC
that a complaint has already been filed with it. This practice
seeks to channel complaints first to the EEOC which then
"advises" the State agency, gives it sixty days, and then the
EEOC automatically proceeds. The statute does not contem-
plate this procedure.35
The first error in this analysis is that the Commission does not
advise the state agency that a charge has already been filed with the
EEOC. It cannot so advise the state agency because a charge cannot be
filed with the EEOC until the state deferral provisions of the Act are
complied with. Rather, the Commission advises the state agency that
the complainant has attempted to file a charge with the EEOC, stating
that the charge appears to fall within the agency's jurisdiction, and re-
questing the agency to proceed to investigate the case. Only after the
state proceeding has been terminated or the sixty-day waiting period
has lapsed does the Commission treat any charge as properly filed
with it.
The court next asserts that the Commission procedure "seeks to
channel complaints first to the EEOC."' 6 What the procedure actually
seeks to do is insure that the complainant does not lose the opportunity
to have his case heard in a federal forum simply because he attempted
to file his charge with the EEOC prematurely. The only way the Com-
mission can do that is by taking steps to guarantee that the first agency
to consider the case is the local commission. The express policy under-
lying the state deferral procedure is, as stated in the current regula-
tions, to "encourage the maximum degree of effectiveness in the state
and local agencies. ' 37 The current procedure succeeds in carrying that
policy into effect; requiring the complainant personally to carry his
case to the local agency and back would not.
The court concludes that the Commission's procedure is not con-
templated by the statute. The relevant portion of the statute reads:
"[N]o charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this section by the
person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings
have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such pro-
ceedings have been earlier terminated . *... ,3sThe Act contains no
wording which requires the state proceedings to have been "com-
35 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324 at 6847.
36 Id.
37 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (1969).
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
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menced" by the aggrieved individual personally rather than on his
behalf by means of a charge referred to the agency by the EEOC. The
established Commission procedure is in full accord with the statute.
2. Date of filing. The court has one further objection to the EEOC
procedure:
Under the Act, when the appellant's letter to the EEOC was
received it was thereby filed as the filing date cannot be
manipulated by the commission. . .. Thus the charge here
concerned was filed when received and at that time the EEOC
had no authority over the matter because it had then not yet
been presented to the Colorado commission.3 9
The support for this conclusion is found in a statement by the
EEOC and a provision in the Commission's regulations that an in-
formal charge not containing all the elements required of a charge by
EEOC regulations 40 is deemed filed as of the date of its receipt by the
EEOC even though it is reduced to proper form at a later time.41 That
policy and that regulation are inapplicable to this situation. They deal
only with relation back for purposes of establishing whether a charge
was filed within the applicable filing deadlines where the original
charge contained minor imperfections. The regulation is entitled
"Contents; amendment ' 42 and is concerned only with what informa-
tion the charge must include and what effect later technical amend-
ments have on the filing date. The informal charge must still meet all
the other requirements of the Act in order to be a formally filed charge.
It must have been filed within the applicable filing deadlines; 43 it must
allege acts occurring after July 2, 1965; 44 it must be filed by a person
claiming to be aggrieved; 45 and if the act occurred in a state which has
a properly empowered state commission, the informal charge must
have been filed more than sixty days after commencement of state pro-
ceedings or within thirty days of the termination of such proceedings. 46
If any of these requirements are not met, there is no filed charge.
The Commission regulation cited by the court does not conflict with
this because it deals only with relation back of amendments to correct
technical defects and omissions.
39 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324, at 6847.
40 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(a) (1969).
41 The regulation cited by the court is 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1969).
42 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1969).
43 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(d) (1964).
44 See note 5 supra.
45 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(a) (1964).
46 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(b) (1964).
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If the court had also read the current Commission regulation govern-
ing deferral to state agencies, it might have discovered its misinterpre-
tation. In that regulation the Commission makes clear that mere
physical receipt of a charge is distinct from a formal filing. The regula-
tion refers throughout to all preliminary complaints simply as "docu-
ments." Only where it refers to "documents" after state proceedings
have terminated or continued for more than sixty days does it call
them "charges." 47
Aside from the technical argument whether the charge was filed on
receipt by the EEOC, the court's denial of the power of the EEOC
to "manipulate" the filing date seems to imply that the complainant
must physically file a complaint after termination of state proceedings
or lapse of the sixty-day waiting period. However, when the Commis-
sion already has at its disposal all the information it needs to process
the case and the state deferral period is terminated, there is nothing
to be accomplished by requiring the aggrieved party to recopy his old
charge and remail it or carry it back down to the EEOC regional
office. Nor is there anything to be accomplished by requiring even the
filing of a request that the EEOC assume jurisdiction. The only rea-
son for requiring a formal filing after state agency processing is to
establish a clearly identifiable date of filing. The EEOC procedure pro-
vides for such a clearly identifiable date.4 On the other hand, the
requirement of a formal refiling by the complainant at this stage would
have the negative effect of creating one more gap in the EEOC
processing where a certain number of lay-complainants might give up
in discouragement or lose their cases through ignorance of the law.
The EEOC state deferral procedure conforms to the requirements of
the statute and is the most efficient means of insuring that state com-
missions are utilized effectively.
3. The prior case law. Four cases are cited by the Tenth Circuit in
its opinion: EEOC v. Union Bank,49 Edwards v. North American Rock-
well,5° IBEW, Local 5 v. EEOC,51 and Washington v. Aerojet-General
Corp.5 2 In neither of the first two cases was the state machinery acti-
vated either by the individual or by the EEOC; both courts correctly
held that state proceedings must be commenced before a charge may
be filed with the EEOC. 3 Love does not dispute the necessity of filing
47 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1969).
48 See text at note 13 supra and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(iii), (iv), and (v) (1969).
49 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1969).
50 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
51 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
52 282 F. Supp. 517 (CD. Calif. 1968).
53 408 F.2d at 869: "It is undisputed that Miss Buckley had not availed herself of the
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with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, but argues that his com-
plaint was effectively filed with the agency through the EEOC state de-
ferral procedure.
In the Local 5 case the charge was processed through the first de-
ferral procedure set out above.5 4 The Third Circuit upheld the pro-
cedure against numerous challenges by the union. The court in Love
attempted to dispose of Local 5 in this manner:
[T]he Third Circuit held that a charge when filed with the
EEOC before the expiration of the State's sixty day period
was not then valid. The same situation here prevails because
appellant's charge was filed with the EEOC before Colorado
had a chance to act on it. The court in I.B.E.W. however
found a subsequent charge filed within the statutory time
intervals and sequence was valid and within the two hundred
ten day period.55
The first sentence is correct-the Local 5 court and the EEOC both
concluded that the premature filing was invalid. Therefore, the Com-
mission "forwarded Carl's complaint to the Pennsylvania Department
of Labor and Industry, Human Relations Commission (the Penn-
sylvania Commission),"58 and the court sanctioned that procedure. The
EEOC retained the original copy of Carl's premature charge, and the
"subsequent charge" referred to by the Love court was nothing more
than the Commission's form letter inquiring whether Carl desired the
EEOC to assume jurisdiction.57 The original premature charge was the
only document in existence at that time which contained any state-
ment of the facts of the case.
The only distinction between the procedures followed in Local 5
and in Love is that the complainant in the former case received an
"assumption of jurisdiction" letter while the Commission automatically
benefits afforded by Cal. Labor Code § 1197.5 at the time she filed her charge with the
EEOC, nor is there any indication that she has done so since filing the charge." 291
F. Supp. at 207: "Although plaintiff's Charge to the EEOC indicates that the allegations
contained in that Charge were previously filed with a state or local government agency,
this assertion appears to be incorrect."
54 Text following note 13 supra.
55 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9324, at 6847.
56 398 F.2d at 429.
57 The union's petition for certiorari is enlightening on this point: "In the meantime,
the Federal Commission had written to Mr. Carl on December 16, 1965 requesting him
to indicate on its letter by filling in the appropriate blank space whether Mr. Carl
wanted the Federal Commission to assert jurisdiction. Mr. Carl indicated on the letter
that he wished the Federal Commission to assert jurisdiction and returned the letter to
the Federal Commission on December 27, 1965." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4,
IBEW, Local 5 v. EEOC, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
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assumed jurisdiction in the latter case. Since the Commission did not
formalize a deferral procedure in its regulations until November 8,
1968,58 the difference in handling by the EEOC is easily explained on
the facts of the cases. In the Local 5 case the Pennsylvania commission
accepted the charge referred to it and continued its proceedings be-
yond the sixty-day mandatory delay period. 9 Therefore, the Commis-
sion wrote to the complainant to determine whether he desired the
EEOC to assume jurisdiction. By contrast, the Colorado commission,
within ten days of Love's premature filing, rejected the opportunity to
process the charge and requested the EEOC to proceed with its in-
vestigation.0 The Commission did so. The distinction between the
two cases is a formal one at best and the deferral procedure should
have been upheld in both cases. As pointed out above, both procedures
conform to the requirements of the statute, and the procedure followed
in Love is preferable on policy grounds.61
The Washington62 case is also distinguishable. After filing a pre-
mature charge with the EEOC, Washington personally filed a com-
plaint with the California Fair Employment Practice Commission, 3
but then requested the EEOC to assume jurisdiction before sixty days
had lapsed and before the California agency terminated its proceed-
ings. He did not renew his request after the state proceedings were
terminated.64 Undeniably Washington's request was premature, as the
court ruled. The court's reasoning, however, implies that the simple
request to assume jurisdiction would have incorporated the informa-
tion in the premature charge to constitute a valid charge if it had been
filed eighteen days later.65 The reasoning also suggests that the han-
dling of the case by the EEOC may be determinative of when the
charge is officially filed:
[T]his Court is aware of no authority, and none has been
cited to it, which would permit the establishing of a filing date
wholly by operation of law without reference to when the
EEOC received a charge or some other document from plain-
tiff, or when the EEOC assigned a case file number to this
matter .... 66
58 See 33 Fed. Reg. 16408 (1968).
50 398 F.2d at 250.
60 61 CCH Lab, Cas. 9324, at 6846.
61 Text following note 47 supra.
62 282 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
03 Id. at $18.
64 Id. at 519.
65 "Perhaps a new filing date can be established by a subsequent act of the plaintiff
seeking to incorporate the initial complaint . 282 F. Supp. at 521.
66 Id. at 521-2.
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If an incident as inconsequential and totally within the Commission's
discretion as the assignment of a case file number may be determina-
tive of date of filing, a procedure such as that now detailed in the
Commission's regulations6 7 should be equally effective.
Two cases not cited by the court in Love are also relevant.6 Jefferson
v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic" may lend some support to the posi-
tion taken by the Tenth Circuit. The Jefferson court held that the
charge filed with the EEOC was not timely because the state agency
complaint was not filed until sixteen days later. However, the case
does not reveal whether the EEOC ever attempted to assume jurisdic-
tion either automatically or at Jefferson's instigation. The precedent
value of the case is also undercut by the court's other holdings which
reflect a severely restrictive interpretation of the Act rejected by other
courts. The Jefferson court's holding that the sixty-day period allotted
the Commission to investigate and attempt conciliation 70 is mandatory
rather than directory71 has been overruled by the Ninth Circuit 72 and
rejected elsewhere when the issue has arisen.73 Likewise, the court's
holding that "[t]he EEOC must exhaust its powers and perform its
duties before relief in court may be sought" 74 conflicts with the nu-
merous holdings that the EEOC need not attempt conciliation before
the complainant can take his case to court.7 5
The second case requiring mention is Marquez v. Ford Motor Co.76
In reconsidering an earlier ruling dismissing the action, the court
there directly upheld the Commission's state deferral procedure, stating
67 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(iii), (iv), and (v) (1969).
68 A third case of some relevance is Burney v. North American Rockwell Co., 302 F.
Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969). It is clear from the court's statement of the case that
Burney's charge was processed through the Commission's state deferral procedure, but
no objection was raised by the defendant.
69 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9278 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
71 See 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9278, at 6648.
72 Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).
73 See, e.g., Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Everett v. Trans-World Airlines,
298 F. Supp. 1099 (W.D. Mo. 1969); EEOC v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 189, 61 CCH
Lab. Cas. 1 9318 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Fore v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 293 F. Supp.
587 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
74 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9278, at 6648.
75 See, e.g., Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Dent v.
St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Pilot Freight Carriers v.
Walker, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.
1968).
76 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9332 (D. Neb. 1968).
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[b]ecause the clear intent of Congress, according to 42
U.S.C.A. 2000e-12, is to vest with the EEOC the power to es-
tablish suitable procedures under which it may function and
because the EEOC has established suitable procedures, as
above stated to govern the situation here presented, where a
party prematurely files a charge with the EEOC before prop-
erly registering a complaint with state authorities, this Court
reverses its prior belief that the filing with the EEOC was
premature and therefore prevented this Court from assuming
jurisdiction. 7
The court's argument is well founded. The statutory provision cited
not only specifically empowers the Commission to issue procedural
regulations78 but also implies the power to issue more informal inter-
pretations of the Act's provisions. 9 Thus, the fact that the state de-
ferral procedure was not spelled out in EEOC regulations at the time
that the charges of Love and Marquez were processed 0 should be no
hindrance to their federal court actions. As discussed above,8' the
Marquez court was also correct in describing the deferral procedures
as "suitable" under the Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
As other courts have noted in dealing with cases arising under Title
VII, "the statute leaves much to be desired in clarity and precision."8' 2
Thus, the question whether the EEOC may institute a deferral pro-
cedure simply is not answered by the Act. The Local 5 and Mfarquez
courts have supplied the correct answer. If other lower courts, the Love
court on petition for rehearing, and the Supreme Court give careful
consideration to the issue, they should see the merits of the state de-
ferral procedure and uphold it against further attack.83
77 Id. at 6875. See also Spell v. Stage Employees, Local 77, 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9285
(D.NJ. 1969), upholding the EEOC deferral procedure without discussion.
78 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1964).
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1964).
80 The current version of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 was adopted November 8, 1968. 33 Fed.
Reg. 16408 (1968).
81 Text at note 38 supra and following note 47 supra.
82 Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
83 A more recent district court case from the Tenth Circuit has upheld the EEOC
state deferral procedure by purporting to distinguish the Love case. Vigil v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 9350 (D. Colo. 1969).
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